Regional Sales Agency, Inc. v. Roland W. Reichert : Unknown by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
1990
Regional Sales Agency, Inc. v. Roland W. Reichert :
Unknown
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Bryce E. Roe; Fabian and Clendenin; Attorneys for Respondent.
Ephraim H. Fankhauser, Attorneys for Appellant.
This Legal Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Legal Brief, Regional Sales v. Reichert, No. 900029.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1990).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/2839







IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
REGIONAL SALES AGENCY, INC., 
a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
ROLAND W. REICHERT, 
Defendant and Petitioner. 
Petition No. UMki 
RESPONDENT'S SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
Petition for Review of Decision of Utah Court of Appeals 
Reversing in Part and Affirming in Part 
Judgment of the Third District Court of Salt Lake County 
Ephraim H. Fankhauser, Esq. 
243 East 400 South, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Petitioner 
Bryce E. Roe, Esq. 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN, P.C. 
215 South State Street 
12th Floor 
P.O. Box 510210 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151 
Attorneys for Respondent 
APR 1 3 IVvi! 
Cterk, Supreme Court, Utah 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
REGIONAL SALES AGENCY, INC., 
a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
ROLAND W. REICHERT, 
Defendant and Petitioner. 
Petition No, 
RESPONDENT'S SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
Petition for Review of Decision of Utah Court of Appeals 
Reversing in Part and Affirming in Part 
Judgment of the Third District Court of Salt Lake County 
Ephraim H. Fankhauser, Esq. 
243 East 400 South, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Petitioner 
Bryce E. Roe, Esq. 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN, P.C. 
215 South State Street 
12th Floor 
P.O. Box 510210 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151 
Attorneys for Respondent 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
I' hi T, { 1 
ARGUMENT, , 3 
T Grounds for the Disqualification of Judqe Billings 
Have Not Been Shown 3 
TT The Raising of the Issue of Judge Billings's 
Disqualification Is Not Timely,.............. , .5 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Citation Page 
Cases 
Madsen v. Prudential Federal Savings & Loan Association. 
767 P.2d 538 (Utah 1988)
 4 5 
Voltmann v. United Food Co.. 147 F.2d 514, 517 (2 Cir.1945) 6 
Other Authorities 
Rule 50, Rules of Utah Supreme Court 1 
50 A.L.R.2d 143 A 5 
78-7-1, Utah Code Annotated J 3 
Canon 3(C) (1) (d) (iii) Code of Judicial Conduct 3 
-ii-
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
REGIONAL SALES AGENCY, INC., 
a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
ROLAND W. REICHERT, 
Defendant and Petitioner. 
Petition No. 
RESPONDENT'S SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
Petitioner, in contravention of Rule 50, Rules of Utah 
Supreme Court, has not confined himself to arguments first raised 
in the brief in opposition to the petitionj for certiorari, but 
has argued an issue that was never presented to the Utah Court of 
Appeals, was not urged as a basis for granting the petition for 
certiorari, and was not treated in respondent's opposing brief. 
Accordingly, respondent tenders this supplemental brief dealing 
only with the new issue raised in petitioner's reply. 
FACTS 
Based upon an affidavit of Ephraim H. Fankhauser, this 
court is being asked to consider the following facts: 
Petitioner's counsel, on or about April 6, 1990, became aware for 
the first time that The Honorable Judith Billings, who wrote the 
opinion for the Court of Appeals in this case was related by 
marriage to Peter Billings and Peter Billings, Jr., who are 
"partners at Fabian & Clendenin"; that counsel was surprised to 
learn of this since Judge Billings did not mention it to him or 
his client; and that petitioner was shocked and felt that he was 
a victim of injustice based upon his perception of bias on the 
part of Judge Billings. 
Petitioner's statement of facts is erroneous in stating 
that Peter Billings and Peter Billings, Jr., are partners at 
Fabian & Clendenin. As the pleadings throughout this case indi-
cate, Fabian & Clendenin is a professional corporation without 
partners. The Fankhauser affidavit contains no indication of 
what knowledge, if any, Judge Billings has or had about the 
financial interests of Peter Billings and Peter Billings, Jr. in 
this lawsuit, or the manner in which the professional corporation 
distributes its income. A fact of which this court may take 
notice is that Peter Billings has been associated with Fabian & 
Clendenin for 40 years, and that Judge Billings's husband, Thomas 
T. Billings, is a lawyer in the competing firm of Van Cott, 




Grounds for the Disqualification of Judge 
Billings Have Not Been Shown 
As a basis for contending that Jfudge Billings should 
have disqualified herself from hearing this case, petitioner 
relies upon 78-7-1, Utah Code Annotated, and Canon 
3(C)(1)(d)(iii) of the Code of Judicial Conduct. Neither of 
these authorities, however, require disqualification of Judge 
Billings. 
The code provision, 78-7-1, reads as follows: 
Except by consent of all parties, no justice, 
judge or justice of the peace shall sit or act as such 
in any action or proceeding: 
(1) in which he is a patty, or in which he is 
interested. 
(2) when he is related to either party by 
consanguinity or affinity within the third degree, 
computed according to the rules of the common law. 
(3) when he has been attorney or counsel for 
either party in the action or proceeding. * * * 
Neither Peter Billings nor Peter Billings, Jr., is a 
party to this proceeding, and neither has lqeen attorney or coun-
sel for either party in the action or proceeding. 
The provision in the Code of Judicial Conduct is some-
what different, though similar. It reads, in part, as follows: 
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(1) A judge should disqualify himself in a pro-
ceeding in which his impartiality might be reasonably 
be questioned, including but not limited to instances 
where: 
* * * 
(d) The judge or spouse, or a person within 
the third degree of relationship to either of 
them, or the spouse of such person: 
(i) is a party to the proceeding, or an 
officer, director, or trustee of a party; 
(ii) is acting as a lawyer in the 
proceeding; 
(iii) is known by the judge to have an 
interest that could be substantially affected 
by the outcome of the proceeding; 
(iv) is to the judge's knowledge likely 
to be a material witness in the proceeding; 
The cited canon is based on the Model Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility and Code of Judicial Conduct of the Ameri-
can Bar Association, as amended. The ABA commentary to (d)(ii) 
reads as follows: 
Commentary: The fact that a lawyer in a proceeding is 
affiliated with a law firm with which a lawyer-relative 
of the judge is affiliated does not of itself disqual-
ify the judge. Under appropriate circumstances, the 
fact that "his impartiality might reasonably be ques-
tioned" under Canon 3(C)(1), or that the 
lawyer-relative is known by the judge to have an inter-
est in the law firm that could be "substantially 
affected by the outcome of the proceeding" under Canon 
3(C)(1)(d)(iii) may require his disqualification. 
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An annotation in 50 A.L.R.2d 143, "Relationship to 
attorney as disqualifying judge," deals, at page 158, with appli-
cation of the rules to appellate judges: 
It has been held frequently that where an attorney 
is related to an appellate court member, and is merely 
associated with the law firm appearing before the 
appellate court, the appellate court judge is not 
thereby disqualified in the absence of a showing that 
the related attorney had a direct pecuniary interest in 
the outcome of the litigation. 
And under the provisions of the cited canon, the interest of the 
relative must be "substantially affected." 
II. 
The Raising of the Issue >^f Judge Billings's 
Disqualification Is Not Tirfiely 
A recent case of this court dealing with disqualifica-
tion of judges, Madsen v. Prudential Federal Savings & Loan Asso-
ciation, 767 P.2d 538 (Utah 1988), stressed that timeliness is 
essential in filing a motion to disqualify. Although that case 
and many of the cases cited in it talk about raising the issue of 
disqualification at the earliest moment after knowledge of the 
facts upon which the disqualification is biased, we do not read 
the cases as excluding the general view that the parties have an 
obligation to make reasonable inquiry as to facts that might dem-
onstrate a basis for some action, and in this case any kind of 
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reasonable inquiry would have informed petitioner's counsel of 
the relationship of Judge Billings to employees of Fabian & 
Clendenin. 
Even when a motion to disqualify is made promptly after 
discovery of the facts, the needs of efficient judicial adminis-
tration may require that a motion for disqualification be denied, 
A case representing this point of view is Voltmann v. United Food 
Co.. 147 F.2d 514f 517 (2 Cir.1945). In that case the motion to 
disqualify the trial judge was made as soon as the plaintiff's 
attorney learned that a son-in-law of the judge was a member of 
the firm trying the case. The trial judge denied the motion to 
disqualify which was made during the ninth day of trial. With 
respect to this matter, the Court of Appeals said: 
* * * There was no intimation that his son-in-law had 
anything to do with the case personally or even knew 
that such an action had been brought. He did, of 
course, have an interest in the earnings of the firm of 
which he was a member, but there was nothing to indi-
cate that the fees of his firm were contingent or that 
the outcome of this trial would make any difference to 
him financially. No doubt the judge would have 
declined to sit in the case had he been aware at the 
outset that there would be any objection to his sit-
ting, and his refusal to sit in cases in which this 
firm was interested would make assurance doubly sure 
that no one would feel, however lacking in factual 
basis the feeling might be, that he could not be imper-
fectly impartial. 
* * * 
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The judge was plainly empowered to decide whether 
"in his opinion" it was such a connection with one of 
the parties as would make it improper for him to sit. 
The statute makes the exercise of sound judicial dis-
cretion by the judge a test in sucph circumstances, and 
if his decision is not shown to have been arbitrary or 
capricious, there is no abuse of discretion calling for 
reversal. We think that there was no abuse in this 
instance. It was late in the trial and the matter was 
presented for consideration, and though the plaintiffs 
were in no way responsible for that fact, it was a cir-
cumstance to be considered in fairness to all 
concerned. 
It may be assumed that if the mattfer had been called to 
Judge Billings's attention, she would have given mature consider-
ation to the question of whether she should be disqualified or 
not. The respondents had nothing to do with the question of 
whether she should be disqualified, and it would be unfair to 
them to set aside the decision of the Coutt of Appeals on the 
basis of what might be an "appearance" of impartiality. What 
might be a ground for disqualification at the beginning of a 
case, in many instances will not be in the middle or at the end 
of a case. 
In any event, the disqualification of Judge Billings 
would make no difference in the final outcome since the errors 
committed by the trial judge were plain. the petition for cer-
tiorari should be denied. 
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